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REMARKS

UPON

COLONEL FULLARTON's

"View of the *Engliſh* Intereſts in *India*."

BY AN OFFICER,

Late in the Company's Service in BENGAL.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN STOCKDALE, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

MDCCLXXXVIII.

[Price One Shilling and Sixpence.]

TO THE

OFFICERS

IN THE SERVICE OF THE

EAST INDIA COMPANY IN BENGAL.

GENTLEMEN,

THAT you feel a ſtrong and juſt indignation for the groſs and unmerited abuſe which has been uttered againſt you collectively ſince the cloſe of the late war, cannot be doubted. The evidence of facts, however, pleads ſo ſtrongly in your favour, and the ſervices which you have rendered your native country are ſo ſtriking and important, that thoſe now in England, who have had the honour of ſpending the moſt active period of their lives amongſt you, deemed it more eligible to ſuffer the deluſion which has prevailed to vaniſh of itſelf, than to oppoſe it, from a conviction that a few months from the preſent time muſt put an

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end to it. The Public, which ultimately decides with impartiality, muſt do us juſtice. Thus we have continued to reaſon; but an attack has been lately made upon us from a quarter ſo reſpectable in point of rank and abilities, that to be longer ſilent would be criminal.

Colonel Fullarton is a ſoldier, a gentleman of pleaſing manners, a ſcholar, a man of buſineſs, and a member of the Britiſh ſenate. When a perſon of this deſcription deliberately publiſhes to the world his opinion of our officers and ſoldiers, ſuch an opinion, if uncontradicted, would neceſſarily have great weight; and the queſtion has been put to me repeatedly, "Do the "Bengal officers in England allow, that "they deſerve the character which has "been given of them by Mr. Fullar-"ton?"

I have now, therefore, on your behalf and my own, taken upon me to reply to, and I hope to refute, the miſrepreſentations of Colonel Fullarton, in ſo far as they concern

concern us, and ſlightly to mention ſuch other parts of his publication, as a long reſidence in India enabled me to notice.

You, Gentlemen, I am inclined to believe, will read with as much ſurpriſe as indignation, the very extraordinary account which the Colonel has received, God knows from whom, of the ſtate of our army. You know how erroneous it is; and as to Bengal and its dependencies, your own ſenſes hourly convince you, that you have preſerved to Great-Britain rich, flouriſhing, and populous kingdoms, not uncultivated waſtes, and deſerted towns.

Strange indeed have been the ſcenes which have paſſed here, ſince I quitted your ſociety. Our native country attacked, during the late war, in all her dependencies, experienced various turns of fortune; but at the cloſe of it, was ſtripped of all her poſſeſſions in the Weſt, and was compelled to relinquiſh many of our conqueſts in the Eaſt as the price of peace. Bending under the weight of public debt,

and ſinking under the preſſure of taxes, which miſmanagement or misfortune had rendered neceſſary, every enlightened ſtateſman looked to that country which you preſerved, as to the beſt and almoſt the only future reſource of Great-Britain.

In return for the ſervices you have performed, what have you received? Mortifying ſuperceſſions, and the moſt opprobrious ſlanders. The ſufferings of our countrymen in India have been paſſed as ſilently over, as if they never had had exiſtence; and even that moſt deteſtable action of M. Suffrein's, which no man amongſt us ever mentioned but with horror, has excited neither ſurpriſe nor reſentment in Great Britain. Some, as gallant youths as England ever produced, are at this inſtant periſhing in the priſons of Seringapatam, ſent thither by M. Suffrein; where they remain unnoticed, and unlamented. Think not, Gentlemen, that reparation will much longer be with-held from you. The people of England are generous and ſenſible, nor can they continue

tinue the dupes of thoſe who have ſo egregiouſly miſled them.

Of our late Governor-General, I ſhall ſay but few words. He is now upon the point of being tried before the higheſt tribunal upon earth, and he will go to that trial, covered over with the applauſe of his countrymen in Indoſtan, and with the unanimous thanks of his employers at home. You, Gentlemen, well know the opinion which the millions you live amongſt entertain of his conduct towards them. Yet ſo ſtrong are the feelings of humanity in Britiſh boſoms, that the Houſe of Commons, the repreſentatives of the people of England, have wiſely, and properly, called upon Mr. Haſtings to anſwer to charges, which themſelves have never read. This anſwer they have lately received, and in the ſame ſpirit of wiſdom and juſtice they have declared the anſwer to be falſe and evaſive, without looking into it. In order to render this proceeding the more complete, the Committee for managing the proſecution conſiſts of the

firſt characters in the nation. A love of juſtice has united men, who were long by hatred, ambition, or private intereſts, kept aſunder. The gallant General who ſigned the fatal convention at Saratoga, the foundation of the national war; the friends of the Miniſter under whoſe auſpices that unfortunate expedition was planned; the men who oppoſed that expedition, and threatened for years to bring the Miniſter of England who agreed to it to the block; all theſe reſpectable Gentlemen are united in the cauſe of humanity, and in the proſecution of Mr. Haſtings.

How egregiouſly have we been miſtaken through life. It is impoſſible to ſuppoſe any ſociety ſo perfect, as that ſome improper perſons ſhall not gain admittance into it; but you well know the general character of our ſervice; the wars in which we have been engaged were carried on with the utmoſt humanity. Priſoners we never retained for a day, except they were wounded, and thoſe have been attended by our ſurgeons, and with the ſame care and tenderneſs as our own troops.

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The ſeverities exerciſed by the country governments are unknown amongſt us, and the attachment of our Sepoys would, to a man of plain ſenſe, be a convincing proof, that we are generally as attentive to do them juſtice, as we are to their diſcipline. Theſe facts have been repeatedly urged, but urged in vain; ſuch is the love of humanity which prevails, that an accompliſhed orator has kept the attention of four hundred Gentlemen awake for five hours and a half, by a relation of circumſtances which you well know, never had exiſtence. A man of humanity in England, who mixes in the politer circles, is a very different being, I do aſſure you, from a humane man amongſt us in India. We have the weakneſs to ſuppoſe that a humane man will not contract debts which he knows himſelf unable to pay; that he will attend to the complaints of thoſe immediately under his authority, or command; and that he will relieve the miſeries of the indigent to the utmoſt of his power. No country in the world affords more objects

of real diſtreſs than England. Our ſtreets are crowded with beggars, many of them poor wretches, who would labour if they could get employment. Large families are pining with want in every quarter of the metropolis, and our priſons are filled with unfortunate debtors; but theſe are objects beneath the notice of a modern man of humanity, while the imaginary ſufferings of two eunuchs, ſubjects of the Nabob of Oude (who at this hour enjoy every luxury which from their ſituations they are capable of enjoying), have been dwelt upon with a pathos which equalled the fineſt performance of your Calcutta Roſcius, or our inimitable Mrs. Siddons.

You may give me credit when I aſſure you, that I ſaw a great aſſembly melting with ſorrow, when the tears ſhed, and the groans uttered by Behar and Jewar Ally Cawn, in their dungeons, were pathetically deſcribed. But what was my ſurpriſe to learn from one of our brother officers who had the charge of theſe men, that their

their priſon was one of the largeſt palaces in Fyzabad; and that they had the liberty of every part of it, and alſo of its extenſive gardens.

But though there is not the ſlighteſt foundation for the charges of cruelty which have been brought againſt us, yet I hope and believe, that ere long the officers who ſurvived the hardſhips they ſuſtained in Mahomedan priſons, will publiſh a detail of their unmerited ſufferings to the world. They owe it to themſelves, they owe it to their country, and I am truly happy to inform you, that thoſe officers who ſerved under Brigadier-general Matthews, and who eſcaped the murderer's ſcymetar, and his poiſoned bowl, have fully vindicated themſelves, under the ſanction of our employers, from the foul aſperſions which were caſt upon them, and circulated through every part of Europe, in publications of great authority *.

* The Annual Regiſter of 1782, and the New Annual Regiſter of 1784.

It is incumbent upon us, Gentlemen, to clear our own fame. In a country where every thing is governed by party, it unfortunately happened, that an Adminiſtration in the year 1783 wiſhed to aſſume the government of India. To juſtify this meaſure, it became abſolutely neceſſary that our ſervice ſhould be vilified. Another party defended us, and ſucceeded in turning their opponents out of office. Every thing which the friends to our ſervice then predicted as likely to happen, has in fact happened; and while I am writing, the ſtock of the Eaſt India Company is at one hundred and ſeventy-nine; whereas, had the predictions of our enemies been fulfilled, it would at this moment have been annihilated altogether.

For the ſervices which we have collectively performed, let us at leaſt receive the treatment due to officers, and to gentlemen. But we have been deſcribed as more ſavage than buccaneers, and lawleſs as a banditti. Although I am, ſtrictly ſpeaking, no longer in the ſervice, yet I retain as

warm a regard for it as I ever had. At a late meeting of our officers who are here, a wiſh was expreſſed that ſome reply ſhould be given to Mr, Fullarton's ſtrictures upon our ſervice. I know I am performing an acceptable taſk to my brother officers, in thus attempting to defend their conduct againſt unmerited aſperſions; and were the abilities of the advocate at all equal to the juſtice of your cauſe, I ſhould not dread the world's deciſion upon the merits of the following ſheets.

I am, with real reſpect,

GENTLEMEN,

Your moſt faithful

and obedient Servant,

AN OFFICER,

Late on your Eſtabliſhment.

London,
12th Dec. 1787.

REMARKS,

&c. &c. &c.

IN the courſe of the laſt Summer Colonel Fullarton announced, through the medium of the public papers, his intention of publiſhing, in the enſuing Winter, a View of the Engliſh Intereſts in India. The public curioſity was not a little excited by theſe advertiſements, and we waited with ſome impatience for the day, in which a work ſo induſtriouſly announced was to make its appearance. In order to enhance the importance of this work, and to increaſe our

our eagerneſs for its peruſal, we found, upon opening the book, that it was dedicated to the Board of Commiſſioners who have in effect the charge and the reſponſibility of every political meaſure that reſpects Indoſtan.

The firſt Letter is of conſiderable length, and of the greateſt importance, as it embraces a great variety of ſubjects. It is addreſſed, as it has been generally ſuppoſed, to the venerable Earl of Mansfield. The Letter was not written by Colonel Fullarton on his firſt arrival in India, when his information might naturally be ſuppoſed defective, but on his paſſage to Europe, after two or three years experience in the country of which he principally writes.

We mean not to inveſtigate very cloſely the cauſes of the late war in the Carnatic, nor to enter into a detail of the operations of Sir Eyre Coote. The latter, Colonel Fullarton has paſſed over in a very ſlight manner, and we are not without ſome hopes that the world will ſhortly receive

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an accurate hiſtory of the late war in India. But when a gentleman writes, with a view of inſtructing the Public, or thoſe who are in truſt for the Public, how they may avoid future miſcarriages, by ſtating the cauſes of the paſt, correctneſs is abſolutely neceſſary; and ſo far only ſhall we enter into an examination of the firſt part of his firſt letter, as may be neceſſary, in order to reſcue the Court of Directors, and the ſervants of the Eaſt India Company, from cenſures which they do not deſerve.

The oldeſt ally of the Eaſt India Company in India, is Mahomed Ally Cawn, the preſent Nabob of Arcot. This Prince, though ſtedfaſt we believe in his attachment to the Company, was, as all Eaſtern Princes are, ambitious to enlarge his dominions. From the year 1745 the Mogul empire in Indoſtan has exiſted but in name: and from that period a number of hereditary ſovereignties have been ſpringing up in Indoſtan and Decan; all of which would be repugnant to the firſt principles of the Mogul conſtitution, if that conſtitution had in

fact any exiſtence at the preſent moment. Thus Mahomed Ally is ſtyled the lawful Nabob, and hereditary ſovereign of the Carnatic. In this character he has claimed the exerciſe of the functions of ſovereignty over every part of the Carnatic, and Tanjore. Sometimes he has been ſupported, and ſometimes reſiſted by the Engliſh, either at Madras or in Great Britain, as ambition, intereſt, or opinion, have ſwayed thoſe who governed either at home or abroad. A hoſt of needy adventurers, as Colonel Fullarton juſtly calls them, have at all times been ready to interfere, on the one ſide or the other.

The Nabob was permitted to ſubdue his refractory Polygars without much oppoſition; but his attempt upon Tanjore was preceded by certain occurrences, which were attended with ſuch important conſequences that we ſhall detail them a little more at length than Colonel Fullarton has done.

In

In or about the month of March 1769 a treaty of peace was concluded with Hyder Ally Cawn, by the government of Madras, much againſt the inclination and wiſhes of the Nabob of Arcot. This treaty was not entirely approved of by the Court of Directors; but being made, policy as well as juſtice required, that it ſhould be faithfully obſerved.

We are unacquainted with the motives which induced the King's miniſters, in the month of Auguſt 1769, to ſend a captain of the navy, with powers, to Madras, of a moſt extenſive and dangerous nature. Colonel Fullarton paſſes this extraordinary circumſtance over in the ſlighteſt manner: "An embaſſy (ſays he) had been ſent immediately from the Crown to the Nabob of Arcot, unavoidably in oppoſition to the Company." Why was ſuch an embaſſy ſent? A man of common ſenſe can point out a thouſand miſchievous conſequences that muſt naturally reſult from ſuch an embaſſy. But why the Crown ſhould

think it neceſſary to ſend ſuch an embaſſy, unavoidably in oppoſition to the Company, cannot be accounted for upon any principle that would do credit to the ſervants of the Crown of that day. "Vehement diſputes "(adds Colonel Fullarton) aroſe between "the ambaſſador and the Preſidency of "Fort St. George. The Governor and "Council conſtituted the regular authority "of the ſettlement, and poſſeſſed the "powers of adminiſtration, while the "other claimed ſuperiority as repreſenta-"tive of the ſovereign." Can we wiſh to ſeek further for the cauſes of all the confuſions which prevailed in the Carnatic and Tanjore? Every independent power which the Nabob claimed, Sir John Lindſay, and his ſucceſſor, Sir Robert Harland, ſupported, until, in the courſe of two years, two attacks were made upon Tanjore; by the firſt of which a conſiderable ſum of money was procured by the Nabob; and by the laſt, Tanjore fell into his hands: and now commenced the ſyſtem of agency which Colonel Fullarton has mentioned.

We will not ſay that a hoſt of needy adventurers poſſeſſed themſelves of the confidence of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore; becauſe we believe few ſhared in the confidence or the ſpoils of the Durbars of Madras and Tanjore, though many were in anxious expectation of employment and advantages from each; but from the fatal moment when Sir John Lindſay arrived at Madras, the regular and ſucceſsful government of the Company ceaſed to have exiſtence. In a few years Colonel Lauchlin Macleane returned from India, and appeared publicly at the levee of Lord North, in the character of agent from the Nabob of Arcot. Some time after, William Burke Eſquire, ſecretly, and againſt law, proceeded to Madras, came back to Great Britain, and appeared publicly as agent of the Rajah of Tanjore. In the ſame character he again returned, and remained at Tanjore, until, in the month of June 1782, his couſin the Right Honourable Edmund Burke perſuaded the Marquis of Rockingham to create for him the poſt of Paymaſter of the King's forces in India; his office

office of agent has, we ſuppoſe, expired with the Rajah, who died this year, miſerably poor, at Tanjore. We reprobate as ſtrongly as Colonel Fullarton can do the ſyſtem of agencies to Indian Princes; but we do affirm, that they were originally occaſioned by the pernicious interference of the King's miniſters, an interference which we believe to be as much againſt law, as we know it to be repugnant to ſound policy, and even to common ſenſe.

From the period that the King's Miniſters firſt interfered through their ambaſſador in the affairs of the Carnatic, the influence of the Governor and Council ceaſed to operate for the public ſervice. Hence the total want of preparation to reſiſt Hyder's invaſion in 1780, in ſo far as the Nabob, and his favourite ſon were concerned. Traitors commanded his garriſons: he had either guns without ammunition and ſtores, or ſtores and ammunition without guns. In this detail we ſpeak from the beſt information we have been able

able to procure; and we heſitate not to ſay, that notwithſtanding the groſs miſmanagement of the Nabob, and the provocation given to Hyder, the Carnatic had been perfectly ſecure from invaſion, had the reſpectable and diſciplined force which the Engliſh poſſeſſed, been encamped in the neighbourhood of Arcot in the ſummer of 1780. It is a fact now well known, that had Mr. Whitehill, the Governor, followed the advice of Lord Macleod, Hyder had never entered the Carnatic at all. It is needleſs therefore to go to remote events, in order to adduce the cauſes of the invaſion of the Carnatic. We agree that the unfortunate Nabob was groſsly impoſed upon by miniſters, ambaſſadors, and agents, who made him promiſes which they never performed; that he borrowed money from every man who would lend it him; that he never paid a pagoda which he could avoid paying; and that his revenues were diſſipated, *God knows how*, or given away in preſents, *God knows where*; yet after all theſe truths are acknowledged, it is ſtill equally true that the Engliſh themſelves

ſelves had a force ſufficient to prevent the invaſion of the Carnatic, had they made a proper uſe of it, after it was known that Hyder had left Seringapatam.

Let us now follow Colonel Fullarton in his account of Bengal; and here we are not compelled to make uſe of the information of others, but we can, from our own knowledge, and from perſonal obſervation, refute every ſyllable that he has uttered, both as to the country, the army, and the civil ſervice.

That gentlemen who have never left England ſhould be groſsly miſtaken in their ideas as to Bengal, is not a matter of ſurpriſe; but that Colonel Fullarton, a man of obſervation, poſſeſſing a laudable ſpirit of curioſity, ſhould in this enlightened age publiſh ſuch inconſiſtencies to the world, does indeed excite our aſtoniſhment. For many years the affairs of India have been the ſubject of parliamentary inveſtigation; and although there is no aſſembly in the world where prejudice, paſſion, and pri-

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vate intereſt are more liable to prevail than in the Houſe of Commons; yet as a prodigious maſs of authentic papers and accounts are publiſhed, either in the reports of the committees, or during the two laſt ſeſſions, an Engliſh gentleman, untravelled and unlettered, may be able to form a very accurate idea of the preſent, and the former ſtate of Bengal. We aſſert, with all that confidence which conviction inſpires (to uſe the words of Mr. Shore), that Bengal at no period of time was in a higher ſtate of cultivation, the natives were at no time happier, better protected, or more numerous, or the revenues more productive, than they are at the preſent moment, or than they were during the whole of the late war.

What does Mr. Fullarton mean by the following paſſage? "In former times, the "Bengal countries were the granary of "nations, and the repoſitory of commerce, "wealth, and manufactures in the Eaſt. "Veſſels from all quarters poured out their "treaſures on the banks of the Ganges;

" and the numberleſs nations that people
" the northern regions of Indoſtan, as far
" as Caſhmere, Lahore, and Thibet, in-
" cluding a range of ſeveral thouſand
" miles, uſed to depoſit their riches there,
" as the great mart and centre of their
" traffic. But ſuch has been the reſtleſs
" energy of our miſgovernment, that
" within the ſhort ſpace of twenty years,
" many parts of thoſe countries have been
" reduced to the appearance of a deſert.—
" The fields are no longer cultivated;—
" extenſive tracts are already overgrown
" with thickets;—the huſbandman is plun-
" dered;—famine has been repeatedly
" endured;—and depopulation has en-
" ſued."

We are warranted in affirming, that this paſſage, as far as it relates to Bengal, is groſsly erroneous throughout. It is a fact of univerſal notoriety, that under the Engliſh government large tracts of land have been brought into cultivation, which never were cultivated prior to our government;—that

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frontier Rajahs and Zemindars, heretofore independent of Bengal, but who lived by plundering the induſtrious and inoffenſive natives of Bengal, have, under our adminiſtration, been brought into complete ſubjection, and are now as profitable, as induſtrious, and as contented ſubjects, as any under our dominion. Famine was once, and but once, endured, ſince the Engliſh have had an influence; and that at a time when Mahomed Reza Cawn was at the head of the revenues. It was a viſitation from God, and not to be imputed to the error of man. To the honour of Engliſhmen, the writer of theſe ſheets can affirm, that, individually and collectively, his countrymen did their utmoſt to alleviate thoſe miſeries, which neither rapacity, nor peculation had occaſioned; and to the honour of Mr. Haſtings (though an impeached man) be it mentioned, that the firſt object of his attention, after he ſucceeded to the government of Bengal, was, to adopt meaſures for the effectual prevention of ſo dreadful a calamity in future.

Why ſhould we argue with Mr. Fullarton, when an appeal to facts which cannot be refuted, would effectually convince him of his error? By accounts furniſhed from the India Houſe, and publiſhed by the Houſe of Commons, it appears, that during the late war in India, nearly ſeven millions ſterling in money, ſtores, and proviſions, were ſent from Bengal, to Madras and Bombay.

It further appears, that the land revenues of Bengal, for ſome years paſt, have been nearly three millions ſterling, the revenue ariſing from ſalt and opium ſeven hundred thouſand pounds ſterling; both created by Mr. Haſtings, and the ſalt, which has exceeded half a million a year, created during the war; the revenue of Benares, above four hundred thouſand pounds a year; and the ſubſidy and other receipts from Oude conſiderably more than half a million annually. Theſe are the reſources collected from countries ſo miſerably miſgoverned and depopulated, as Mr. Fullarton deſcribes Bengal and its dependencies

pendencies to be; but there are ſtill many very material circumſtances to be conſidered, which make the argument infinitely ſtronger in favour of the zeal and ability diſplayed by the government of Bengal.

We agree with Mr. Fullarton, that Bengal has been juſtly ſtyled the granary of nations and the garden of India; and it is ſo ſtill: but unfortunately, though Bengal has actually increaſed in proſperity, the other parts of Indoſtan have fallen into decay; and the extraordinary difficulty to a man of reflection, is, to account, upon reaſonable grounds, how it has happened that Bengal has not been totally exhauſted, in conſequence of the failure of *all* her foreign reſources.

Nadir Shah, who invaded Indoſtan, we believe in the year 1736, carried away with him from Dehly, and the neighbouring countries, at leaſt fifty millions ſterling; and, what was of more fatal conſequence, he effectually overturned the Mogul empire. From that period all the

upper

upper parts of Indoſtan, north-weſt of the Ganges, have indeed been in the miſerable ſtate in which Mr. Fullarton ſo erroneouſly deſcribes Bengal. We preſume he will not impute theſe calamities to the miſgovernment of the Engliſh: hence one ſource of wealth to Bengal ceaſed to have exiſtence. When Nadir Shah died, the Perſian empire fell to decay: hence another ſource of wealth to Bengal ceaſed to exiſt. The trade to the two Gulphs was formerly of infinite advantage to Bengal, but the deſtruction of the Perſian empire, and the diſorders which have prevailed for many years in Egypt, added to a ſhort-ſighted policy in England, counteracted in a great degree every effort uſed by the government in Bengal ſince the year 1772, to revive the trade to the Gulphs to any conſiderable extent. It is carried on, and whatever returns are made, are in favour of Bengal. The inveſtments exported from Bengal to Europe were formerly purchaſed by bullion ſent from Great Britain, Holland, France, Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden, to Bengal,

amounting annually perhaps to a million ſterling; but latterly, that is, in the laſt twenty years, no European nation has exported bullion to India. Inveſtments have been purchaſed with ſurplus revenues, and prodigious quantities of bullion have been imported into Great Britain from Calcutta. Let any candid and impartial man only conſider theſe circumſtances, and he will give due credit to the government of Fort William, for preſerving ſo invaluable a country to Great Britain as Bengal is, which not only exiſts, but flouriſhes, under drains that muſt have totally exhauſted any other country upon the globe. If experience were not ſuperior to theory, we ſhould pronounce decidedly, that Bengal was a ruined country many years ago, knowing, as we do, the diſadvantages it has ſuſtained.

The inſtitution of the government of Bengal is perfectly new in the annals of mankind. A kingdom of great extent, containing above ten millions of people, compoſed of a brave ſoldiery, the beſt farmers, and the moſt ingenious manufacturers

facturers in the world, is under the dominion of an iſland, whoſe veſſels muſt traverſe above half the globe, before the ſubjects of that iſland can recruit the comparatively ſmall number of Engliſhmen who retain Bengal to Great Britain, collect its revenues, and perform every function of government. But this is not all; for although the Eaſt India Company is in fact the abſolute ſovereign only of the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, Benares, Ghazipore, and a part of Oriſſa, yet it retains an influence, and is reſponſible for the defence againſt foreign enemies of the extenſive dominions of the Nabob of Oude, namely Oude, Rohilcund, Corah Currah, Allahabad, and a part of the Douab, including, under both governments, countries twelve hundred and fifty miles in length, and from four hundred and fifty, to five hundred and fifty in breadth.

We truſt we have refuted Colonel Fullarton's aſſertions by a relation of facts which muſt ſpeak to the common ſenſe of mankind. Having ſo done, we will now appeal to the

the evidence of men who have the beſt means of information either abroad or at home. Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas, and Mr. Grenville, three gentlemen to whom Mr. Fullarton has dedicated his book, have with apparent pride and pleaſure, ſtated in the Houſe of Commons, the flouriſhing ſtate of Bengal, and its infinite importance to Great Britain. Sir John Macpherſon ſpeaks of the country in the following terms;—ſo late as the month of Auguſt 1786:

" The condition in which Earl Corn-
" wallis will receive the government of
" India, is creditable to the Company, and
" cannot but be ſatisfactory to the nation.
" The native inhabitants of this kingdom
" are, I believe, the happieſt and beſt pro-
" tected ſubjects in India; our native allies
" and tributaries are ſatisfied, and confide
" in our protection; the country powers
" are emulouſly aſpiring to the friendſhip
" of the Engliſh; and from the king of
" Tidore towards New Guinea, to Timur

" Shaw on the banks of the Indus, there " is not a ſtate that has not lately given " us proofs of confidence and reſpect."

Mr. Shore profeſſes his conviction, that property is more ſecure, and individuals leſs oppreſſed, under our adminiſtration, than under their Nabobs, the government that exiſted for above two centuries.

It is impoſſible for any gentleman who has travelled at different periods through Bengal, not to obſerve the progreſſive ſtate of improvement which has taken place; but one very ſerious evil attends the Engliſh government: it is, however, inherent in the conſtitution, nor is it poſſible to apply a remedy to it. The Nabobs of Bengal granted jaghires in various parts of the country. The jaghiredars, who reſided on their jaghires, were the only perſons who could at all come under any thing approaching (and that very diſtantly) to the country gentlemen of England. As the jaghires have fallen in, our

our government adds their produce to the revenue, and has ceaſed to grant additional jaghires. This is the effect of an unnatural government, as ours moſt undoubtedly is, becauſe our great object ever has been, and ever muſt be, to convert the labours of the people of Bengal, and the produce of the country, to the advantage of Great Britain.

As to the commerce of Bengal (ſuch parts of it excepted as have decayed, owing to the deſtruction of the Mogul and Perſian empires), it never has flouriſhed ſo much as of late years; but it is diverted into different channels. The rage for wearing muſlins and callicoes prevails in England and throughout Europe more than at any former period. The manufacture of piece-goods in Bengal is now greater than ever; and the improved and improving ſtate of the Filiature ſilk is an object of infinite importance to Great Britain. There are now, owing to the conſtitution of our government, but two modes of throwing back into circulation the money

collected from the revenues of Bengal; namely, by the pay of the army and civil eſtabliſhments, and by advances for the inveſtment. It is a fact, that the manufacturers of Bengal have not been oppreſſed or ill-treated by the ſervants of the Eaſt India Company, though it is equally certain that inſtances have happened, in which, by colluſive contracts, the Company have been made to pay more than the fair price for goods bought on their account. Theſe evils are hard to be totally remedied; for the government in Bengal is as liable to impoſitions as that of Great Britain either at home or in her American, or Weſt India dependencies.

In Oude and the upper parts of India, the revenues are collected now as they have been from the firſt entrance of the Mahometans into Indoſtan, namely, at the point of the ſword. An Aumil collects as much, and a Zemindar pays as little, as he can. If Great Britain ſhall at any future period aſſume the entire government of Oude, and

depoſe the preſent ſovereign, we may be able to collect the revenues of that country with as much regularity and eaſe, and with as little ſeverity, as we now collect the revenues of Bengal. But if we wiſh to preſerve a character for moderation, juſtice, and good faith, we ſhall ſubſcribe to the doctrine of Mr. Haſtings and Earl Cornwallis, that the Engliſh have nothing to do with the internal government of Oude, while the Nabob continues to pay his ſubſidy, for troops employed by his own deſire, in the defence of his own dominions.

We muſt ſtop a moment to correct a moſt extraordinary error which Mr. Fullarton has committed. In ſpeaking of Oude (page 44) he ſays, Lord Clive ſtipulated for the ſum of forty-ſix lacks of rupees, to pay a brigade which the Company ſtations in the province of Oude. Lord Clive made no ſtipulation of the kind. Sujah Dowlah, by his Lordſhip's treaty, paid fifty lacks of rupees, as a compenſation for the expences of the war in which,

by

by invading Bahar, he had wantonly engaged us; and from an enemy he became an ally: but no ſtipulation was made for the pay of troops ſtationed in his dominions, which omiſſion was in fact the great error of the treaty of Allahabad; nor was it remedied until the year 1773, when Sujah Dowlah engaged to pay two lacks and ten thouſand rupees a month, for a complete brigade, as often as it ſhould be ſtationed in his dominions.

Mr. Fullarton is equally unfortunate in the latter part of this ſentence (page 45): "Little did that ſuperior genius conceive "(meaning Lord Clive), that by his boaſted "treaty, the treaſures of a powerful prince "were indirectly to be transferred into a "ſinking fund, and his whole dominions "converted into an aſylum for the ſole "uſe and benefit of prodigals and incor-"rigibles!"

At the time Mr. Fullarton publiſhed his book, he might have found authentic documents

cuments in the papers printed by order of the Houſe of Commons, which would have convinced him of his error. Sujah Dowlah was in every ſenſe of the word an independent prince to the day of his death, which happened in February 1775; but when he died, the efficient government of Bengal, General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, determined that all treaties expired with him, and they compelled the preſent Nabob to ſign a new treaty, by which he alienated a very rich portion of his hereditary dominions, conſented to an increaſe of his ſubſidy, and afterwards to the levy of additional troops. It is upon record, that between the month of January 1774 and January 1786, the Eaſt India Company actually received from Oude and Benares about thirteen millions ſterling, of which ſum, at leaſt eight millions was remitted to Calcutta, or to the Preſidencies of Madras and Bombay, and of courſe loſt for ever to the circulation of Oude and Benares. We do not mean to aſſert that the civil and military ſervants of

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the Company who ſerved in Oude during the period of twelve years, did not (many of them at leaſt) acquire fortunes there, but the advantages of the "prodigals "and incorrigibles," as Colonel Fullarton politely ſtyles the officers of the army and the civil ſervants, ſink to nothing in compariſon with the amount of the money publicly received from the Nabob's dominions by the Eaſt India Company.

We now come to that which appears to us as the moſt material paſſage in the book (page 43): "If we truſt to our mili-"tary on the Bengal eſtabliſhment for "protection againſt theſe alarming enor-"mities, we ſhall find that entire corps "have exiſted on paper, who, excluſive "of the Commandant and Staff, never had "any exiſtence but on paper; and it will "further appear, that thoſe Sepoys who "have a real exiſtence, are neither well "diſciplined nor regularly paid."

We preſume Colonel Fullarton intends to convey an idea to the world, that to the cloſe

cloſe of the late war, the Bengal army was in the ſtate which he deſcribes it. General Clavering recorded his ſentiments of the European and native troops, which he reviewed in Calcutta, very early after his arrival in Bengal. He ſpoke with admiration and wonder of the ſtate of diſcipline to which we had brought our Sepoys, for he found them in no reſpect inferior to any regiment in his Majeſty's ſervice.

Nine new battalions were added to our eſtabliſhment in the year 1777, that number having been transferred from the Nabob's to the Company's ſervice, though to be paid as heretofore by his Excellency. Nine additional battalions were raiſed when the war with France broke out. In the year 1779, Sir Eyre Coote fixed the general eſtabliſhment of our army, which was thirty-three battalions of Sepoys, and three independent corps.

In the years 1779 and 1780, Sir Eyre Coote reviewed every corps in our army,

from Calcutta to Futtyghur, including thoſe at Berhampore, Dinapore, Chunar, and Cawnpore. His report of the ſtate in which he found the army, does the officers the higheſt honour; but he more particularly diſtinguiſhed the battalions ſtationed in Oude, as ſome of the fineſt corps he had ever ſeen in the field. We notice this, becauſe our officers in Oude have been ſuppoſed regardleſs of the ſtate of their battalions, and totally loſt to every ſenſe of public duty.

Our Engliſh regiments, we are ſorry to ſay, had not much exiſtence, except upon paper, nor could all the repreſentations of the Governor General and Council, or the various officers who commanded in Bengal at different periods, procure from the Court of Directors a ſupply of recruits ſufficient to give us in Bengal and its dependencies, more than eighteen hundred rank and file fit for duty, in ſix Britiſh battalions, during the war. The artillery, one of the fineſt bodies of men in the world, was kept as complete as poſſible;

and

and our battalions of Sepoys are celebrated for gallantry and diſcipline in every region of Indoſtan.

With regard to the pay of the Sepoys, we can affirm, that when it depended upon commanding officers, they were paid with the utmoſt punctuality. It happened, however, in the month of January 1782 (that moſt diſtreſsful period of the whole war), that all the Sepoy corps in Bengal, in Oude, and in Malwa, were four and five months in arrears, owing to the aſtoniſhing efforts which had been made by the Bengal government to relieve the diſtreſſes of Madras and Bombay; but by the fortunate meaſures adopted with the Nabob of Oude, above a million ſterling was procured from him in ſeven months; the Preſidency of Madras was relieved; the arrears of our Sepoys paid up; and India preſerved to Great Britain.

Let us next conſider the ſervices on which our Sepoys, unſupported by Europeans (their officers and a few artillery men ex-

 cepted)

cepted), were employed during the late war in India. The world will then determine if theſe Sepoys were well diſciplined, and had a real exiſtence or not.

In the month of May 1778, a detachment, conſiſting of ſix battalions of Sepoys, one regiment of native cavalry, and a few Candahar horſe, and artillery in proportion, paſſed the Jumna at Calpy, marched acroſs the continent of Indoſtan, ſerved four campaigns againſt the Marattas, with great and extraordinary ſucceſs;—at the cloſe of the war theſe battalions returned to Calpy, under the command of Colonel Charles Morgan, nor was a ſingle complaint preferred againſt them from the Zemindar of any village, nor from the chiefs of any of the diſtricts through which their route lay, in a march of ſeven hundred miles. At their return, there were of old Bengal Sepoys three hundred and eighty men upon an average in each battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel Popham commanded, in the year 1780, a detachment of two thouſand

thouſand Sepoys. This ſmall body, after clearing the Gohud country of fifteen thouſand Marattas, in the performance of which ſervice they were uniformly ſucceſsful, took the ſtrong and hitherto impregnable fortreſs of Gualior.

Lieutenant Colonel Camac, at the head of five battalions of Sepoys, and a train of artillery, advanced towards the province of Malwa, in the month of February 1781, with a view of drawing Madajee Sindia from Guzzerat, and thus to ſecure a peace with the Marattas on honourable terms. He was ſurrounded by numerous bodies of cavalry, in the utmoſt diſtreſs for proviſions, and deemed his ſituation ſo critical, that he wrote in the moſt preſſing and earneſt terms to Colonel Muir and other officers for a reinforcement, which accordingly marched to his aſſiſtance and ſupport; but while yet at a great diſtance, Colonel Camac advanced to the attack of Madajee Sindia's camp, and ſucceeded. He took his guns, elephants, camp-equipage, and a prodigious quantity of grain.

This,

This, in fact, decided the fate of the war. Colonel Muir ſoon after joined Colonel Camac; being the ſenior officer, he aſſumed the command, and in the month of October 1781 ſigned a ſeparate peace with Sindia. In all this arduous ſervice, though deeply in arrears, the detachments of Colonels Popham, Camac, and Muir, behaved with the utmoſt gallantry, and preſerved the ſtricteſt diſcipline.

In the month of February 1781, a detachment of five regiments of Sepoys marched from the neighbourhood of Calcutta to reinforce Sir Eyre Coote, and effected a junction with his army in Auguſt; when Hyder had a hundred thouſand men in the Carnatic, and had formed the deſign of intercepting this little army.

In ſpeaking of the merits of this gallant detachment, the voice of party has not been heard. The governor of Madras, Lord Macartney, the generals Sir Eyre Coote and Stewart, and the government of Bengal, have all mentioned the merits

both

both of its officers and Sepoys in the ſtrongeſt language. The remains of this brave army returned to Bengal in the month of December 1784. It was compoſed of new-raiſed battalions, but ſo well did they preſerve the high character in which Bengal troops were held all over India, that one of the battalions, headed by Lieutenant Williamſon, diſtinguiſhed itſelf on a ſervice of great danger in a very particular manner. When General Stewart was attacked near Cuddalore by the Marquis de Buſſy, this battalion kept its ground, although one of his Majeſty's corps was thrown into confuſion, and actually came to the point of the bayonet with an old French regiment. In a former action the Bengal grenadiers, commanded by Captain James Moore (a nephew of the late Sir William Draper) retook a ſix pounder from a very ſtrong detachment, in the preſence of Hyder's whole army, and kept its ground until Colonel Owen had time to form his troops, and to ſecure his retreat unmoleſted to the main army.

The zeal diſplayed by our officers and Sepoys in quelling the rebellion at Be-

nares, was of a ſingular nature, and moſt important in its conſequences.

In thirty days that rebellion, ſo alarming at one time in its appearance, was effectually quelled, and peace completely reſtored. The exiſtence of the Britiſh empire in India depended upon the preſervation of Bengal and its dependencies during the late war. Half our force was employed on foreign ſervice; and the tranquillity of a country, extenſive as we have deſcribed our own dominion, and thoſe of the Nabob Vizier to be, was effectually ſecured by the vigilance of the government, and the unremitting attention of our military officers to the diſcipline of our native troops.

In page 55, Colonel Fullarton ſays, "It "would ill become me to offer any ſug- "geſtions unfavourable to the military "upon that eſtabliſhment. Brave and "zealous they undoubtedly are, and would "probably defeat their enemies as often "as they hazarded a cloſe engagement, "&c."

If

If our officers are, as the fact aſſuredly is, both brave and zealous, how can it be ſuppoſed that we are ſo loſt to every ſenſe of honour, as to ſuffer entire corps to exiſt but upon paper, or that we do not attend to the diſcipline of our native troops? The aſſertions are contradictory to each other.

After very ingeniouſly aſſembling an army, which, like the Huns and the Viſigoths, muſt ſeek for plunder and ſubſiſtence in new acquiſitions, Colonel Fullarton ſays, "If they direct their progreſs "towards Bengal, they will find that "country as open to invaſion, as it was "on the day when we firſt took poſſeſſion "of it; not a fort, not a barrier, not a "poſt to reſiſt their progreſs, to the very "ſuburbs of Calcutta;" and God forbid that we ſhould ever fortify poſts in Bengal. If we cannot face and conquer our enemies in the field, we muſt inevitably loſe the country. We have, however, an army ſufficient to defend Bengal againſt any force that can be oppoſed to us, provided that army ſhall be ready to move at a moment's

warning, as it undoubtedly ought. We have the garriſon of Chunar, which all the country powers in Indoſtan could not take, if two battalions of Sepoys and twenty Britiſh officers were thrown into it, and that is the preſent ſtrength of the garriſon. We have a ſtrong poſt at Buxar, another at Monghier, and Bengal is naturally of itſelf a very ſtrong country. Two brigades will defend Oude from invaſion; and while Oude is defended, Bengal cannot be attacked, except by the Marattas on the weſt of the Ganges, an experiment we believe they will never attempt.

It is a ſubject of curioſity to gentlemen who are well acquainted with Bengal, to peruſe the deſcriptions given of that country by thoſe who have never ſeen it. An ingenious Member of the Houſe of Commons * has deſcribed the natives to be, as they undoubtedly are, a well-informed, numerous, and induſtrious people, "famed "for all the arts of poliſhed life, while "we were yet in the woods." Is it poſſible for a moment to ſuppoſe, that the

* Mr. Edmund Burke.

Britiſh

Britiſh government could exiſt for a year in ſuch a country, containing ten millions of people, if it were of ſo oppreſſive a nature as this Gentleman and Mr. Fullarton have deſcribed it to be, eſpecially if it be alſo true, that our army is neither regularly paid nor well diſciplined; and that entire corps never had any exiſtence but upon paper? The truth is, that neither the one deſcription nor the other is founded in fact. Our government is not oppreſſive, our army is well paid, ably commanded, and the ſtricteſt attention is paid to its diſcipline; or how could we have reſiſted ſo ſucceſsfully the efforts of an hoſt of enemies in India, when we failed in every other part of the globe.

Page 45, Colonel Fullarton ſays, "It "would treſpaſs on your patience, my "Lord, to expatiate further on a policy "by which a country, ſuperior in wealth "and means to the whole kingdom of "England, has been ſo ſpeedily precipi-"tated, without convulſion or internal

" war, into a ſtate of actual inſolvency: " neither can I, without impertinence to " your Lordſhip's ready apprehenſion, en- " large upon the ſtrong ſuggeſtions that " impreſs my mind with the impending " cataſtrophe, about to cloſe this ſcene of " unexampled depravity."

This is indeed a moſt extraordinary paſſage. Great Britain muſt now raiſe above ſixteen millions ſterling, in order to pay the intereſt of her debt, and to ſupport her eſtabliſhments. We were lately at the eve of a war, and the ſoundeſt politicians ſtill ſtate a war as inevitable. A cautious and an œconomical Miniſter deemed the nation in a ſtate to ſuſtain a war, which could only be carried on by additional loans. Bengal never raiſed a greater revenue than it does at the preſent moment; but our reſources of every kind do not exceed five millions ſterling annually. New ſources of revenue have been explored, and old ones improved, in order to raiſe ſo great a ſum; yet Mr. Fullarton affirms, that Bengal is ſuperior in wealth and means to the whole

whole kingdom of England; and in the year 1784, on his paſſage to Great Britain, he talks of his apprehenſions of an impending cataſtrophe, when in fact all danger was at an end.

Though we have taken the liberty to animadvert with ſome freedom on the exceptionable and erroneous paſſages in Mr. Fullarton's book, we are perfectly ready to agree with him in other parts of it; and upon the peruſal of a note, at the cloſe of his account of Bengal, we ceaſed to be ſurpriſed at the errors which he has been led into, though we cannot withhold our aſtoniſhment that, at this time of day, ſo extraordinary an account ſhould be publiſhed to the world. In page 49, he ſays, "The "preceding remarks on the condition of "Bengal and its adjacent territories, are "not the reſult of perſonal obſervation, "and therefore may be conſidered as leſs "deſerving attention than thoſe which I "have ventured to offer on the affairs of "Coromandel."

In

In all that Mr. Fullarton has ſaid of the power, ability, and inveteracy of Tippoo Sultaun, we agree with him. We believe alſo, that if a peace had not been concluded with that tyrant, Colonel Fullarton would have taken his capital, and effected a revolution; but as the deliberate murder of our gallant countrymen, who were pining in his dungeons when the peace was ſigned, would have been a certain conſequence of a protraction of the war, we rejoice moſt ſincerely that a peace was concluded with him.

The following juſt and forcible remark upon the character of the Britiſh officers in the Sepoy corps on the Coaſt, is equally applicable to our Sepoy officers in Bengal.

Page 217. "The officers upon the "coaſt are habituated to act on emer- "gencies with a facility that few ſub- "ordinate officers in Europe ever have a "proſpect of acquiring. Before an officer "attains

" attains the rank of Captain, he muſt
" unavoidably have been often charged
" with the command of parties in diſtant
" marches, in the conveyance of ſtores,
" in the buſineſs of collections, and in ma-
" naging of refractory Zemindars."

It is a melancholy but a true reflection, that notwithſtanding the juſtice of the foregoing remark, a Lieutenant in the ſervice of the Company, though of twelve years ſtanding, as many are, is liable to be hourly ſuperſeded by boys of fourteen, who are taken from ſchool, and ſent Lieutenants in his Majeſty's ſervice to India; while Heſſian officers, by the late treaty, rank with the king's, according to the dates of their commiſſions.

In Colonel Fullarton's Letter to Lord Macartney and the Select Committee, there are many admirable hints given for the improvement of the army; but the moſt material of the whole, relates to the neceſſity of ſupplying the army with a ſufficient

cient complement of draught and carriage bullocks, in order to enable every corps to move at a moment's warning. The armies on the Coaſt and Bengal ought at all times to be upon a war eſtabliſhment in this reſpect. The expence, it is true, is heavy; but not only our ſucceſs in war, but our very exiſtence depends upon the ſtate of our draught and carriage cattle.

Sir Eyre Coote, as Mr. Fullarton tells us, required thirty thouſand bullocks to enable the Carnatic army to move with effect in 1782; and obtained nine thouſand, which were inſufficient. For the artillery, and the whole army in Bengal and in Oude, ſix thouſand ſeven hundred were entertained, regularly trained, and attached to the various corps of the army; ſo that each battalion with its field-pieces could move on the day the order of march arrived. This arrangement was approved by every officer of experience in Bengal; was recommended in the ſtrongeſt terms by Sir Eyre Coote; was adopted greatly to the advantage of the public ſervice; and was in effect an œconomical regulation,

as more than two thouſand of the number were attached to our troops ſerving in the Carnatic: but in the end, the man who took pains to form and carry into effect ſo important an arrangement, is impeached for it.

Before we cloſe our remarks, we cannot but applaud another of Mr. Fullarton's ideas. Moſt unqueſtionably the powers of Governor and Commander in Chief ſhould be lodged in the ſame perſon. It is natural to man to be fond of power; and while the offices of Governor and Commander in Chief were ſeparated, jealouſies, diſagreements, and delays were unavoidable. The evils were foretold when the ſeparation firſt took place in 1774, and the legiſlature wiſely removed them before Mr. Fullarton publiſhed his ideas to the world.

Important national ſervices have been performed in India in the courſe of the late war, and thoſe who have had a ſhare in preſerving that empire to Great Britain,

during the moſt arduous conteſt in which ſhe ever was engaged, may indeed exult in the importance of their ſervices. We rank Colonel Fullarton amongſt the number, believing him to have exerted himſelf with great zeal and effect in the public ſervice.

The Carnatic is ſtill the dominion of our ally, and has recovered from the ravages of war more ſpeedily than the moſt ſanguine imagination could have formed an idea of. Bengal enjoyed the bleſſings of internal tranquillity during all the late war; its reſources were greatly improved; it ſupplied the preſidencies of Madras and Bombay with men, money, and proviſions; and continued to ſend valuable inveſtments to Europe. It was then, and is ſtill, one of the fineſt countries in the world: and we truſt that it will long continue, what Mr. Dundas has ſo emphatically termed it, *the brighteſt jewel in the Britiſh Crown*.

FINIS.